Hidden Markov Models, HMM 's, are mathematical models of Markov processes with state that is hidden, but from which information can leak. They are typically represented as 3-way joint-probability distributions.
Introduction
1.1. Setting and overview. We can represent probabilistic sequential programs with hidden state as Hidden Markov Models, i.e. HMM 's 1 formulated as probabilistic mechanisms that take prior, input probability distributions and give posterior distributions over (leaked) observations and final state. Here, however, we recast HMM 's as computations over the Giry monad, making them more suitable for denotational semantics. Indeed the monadic view of simple Markov processes in particular is well established [1, 2] , using X →DX where • We give a dual, uncertainty-transformer semantics of HMM 's and prove the duality.
• We show how all of the above is an instance of the general Giry monad as a computation, of which (finite) HMM 's use a discrete portion. • We explain how the "Dalenius effect" is manifested as a compositional issue in this framework, and how it can be treated. In other sections we review abstract channels ( §2.2), hyper-distributions ( §2.3) and the security order ( §6) on hypers.
We believe that Thm. 9.8, in particular its assumptions and proof, is a significant new result.
Our principal aims are these:
• (More abstract) To construct forward-and dual backward semantic spaces for probabilistic sequential computations over hidden state, using monadic computations and partial (refinement) orders in this new context, and we formulate and prove the general properties that make them suitable for embedding finite (for the moment) HMM 's. • (More concrete) To provide the basis for a source-level reasoning method, analogous to Hoare logic or weakest preconditions, for quantitative non-interference in sequential programs. For this, the dual, transformer semantics for HMM 's seems to be a necessary first step, together with a link between the social aspects of security and the mathematical behaviour of a program ( §11). The conclusion §14 discusses the benefits of doing this.
1.3. General notations -see also §A. Application of function f to argument x is written f.x to reduce parentheses. It associates to the left. Although a matrix M with rows, columns indexed by R, C is a function R×C → R, we avoid constant reference to the reals R by writing just R C for that type; similarly we write the type of a vector over X as X . We write M r,c for the element of matrix M indexed by row r and column c; then the r-th row of M is M r,− ; and the c-th column is M −,c , of types Y , X resp. For row-or column vector v: I we write v i for its i-th element. Thus e.g. we have (M −,c ) r =M r,c .
When multiplying vectors and matrices we assume without comment that the vector has been oriented properly, i.e. as a row or column as required. Thus v acts as a row in v·M but as a column in M ·v. Thus for v: X and M : X Y the matrix product v·M is in Y , where here we are using dot (·) for matrix multiplication. Multiplication of scalars will usually be juxtaposition, but occasionally × when we are avoiding ambiguity.
We write for example x: X, i.e. with a colon, when we are introducing a fresh variable x into the discussion at that point; with x∈X we are instead stating a property of some x and X that have been already introduced at some earlier point. 3 That means in the former case that one need not search backwards to see what x is being referred to (and in the latter case, one might).
Other specific notations are explained at first use, and (as noted above) a full glossary in occurrence order is given in §A.
2.3.
Hypers abstract from joint distributions. The joint-distribution matrix J=π C contains "too much" information if we do not need the actual value of y that led to a particular posterior. Abstracting from those output values leads us to a representation of the possible posteriors on their own, retaining however the probability with which they occur (in fact the marginal probability of the value y that produced each one). The advantage we take from that is that HMM 's acquire a monadic structure, acting as Kleisli maps, and furthermore can express other probabilistic notions in a way more suited to calculation: for example, conditional entropies become expected values (of the entropies) over the distribution of posteriors.
More intuitive reasons for the abstraction include that it is appropriate in security to consider the information leakage of a channel C wrt. a prior π to concern only what an adversary can discover about π, and not the actual observations that led to that discovery: whether a spy's vocabulary is "da/nyet" or "yes/no", or indeed whether "yes" means "it's zero" or "it's one", does not affect the information-theoretic threat that spy represents, provided of course that the spy and her controller have agreed on the vocabulary beforehand.
We can abstract from the observations in π C as follows. If column y of J = π C is all zero, then that y will never occur (for any prior); thus we can omit that column.
And if two columns y 1,2 of J are proportional to each other, i.e. are similar (as for triangles), then we can add them together, since for a given prior the same posterior will be inferred for y 1 as for y 2 and the overall probability of inferring that posterior will be the sum of the marginal probabilities for y 1,2 . 4 Finally, a 1-1 renaming of the y-values has no effect on the posteriors and their respective probabilities; so we can remove those names as long as we retain the distinction between separate (non-zero, non-similar) columns.
Abstracting from all that arguably inessential information (about y) leaves only a distribution of posteriors on X and, for us, this is the semantic view. Writing in general DX for 1-summing functions of type X →R ≥ , a discrete distribution over X has type DX and so a discrete distribution of such distributions has type D(DX ) that is D 2 X . Those latter are our hypers, and they are our abstraction of joint distributions X Y.
The values of type DX are called the inners of a hyper, and the outer distribution of a hyper is its distribution over those inners: that is, a hyper on X is a (single) outer distribution over (possibly many) inners, and each inner is a (single) distribution over X itself.
As an example, recall the famous puzzle of Bertrand's Boxes. Three identical boxes contain two balls each: one has two white balls; one has two black balls; and the remaining box has one of each. It is not known which box is which; and one of them is chosen randomly. A ball is drawn at random from it, and it is white. What is the probability that the other ball in that box is also white? We reason as follows.
The state space is X ={0, 1, 2}, referring to the number of white balls in each box. The prior distribution in DX is uniform, which we can write ( 1 /3, 1 /3, 1 /3). The HMM is a channel that takes input x to the distribution (white → x /2, black → 1− x /2). The joint distribution p say, of type D(X ×{white, black}), would be such that p(1, white) = 1 /3× 1 /2 = 1 /6, the probability that Box 1 was chosen and that the ball taken from it was white. The overall probability that a white ball is taken (from whichever box) is the white-marginal 0+ 1 /6+ 1 /3 = 1 /2 (which is obvious from symmetry anyway), and the posterior distribution 36 
Each step H 1,2 takes an input-to an output state in X ; the observations y 1,2 : Y are accumulated. In each step H 1,2 the output state is determined by a markov M 1,2 on the input to that step, and the observation is determined independently by a channel C 1,2 on the same input, i.e. before application of the markov. In fact avg.[[J]] for any J in X Y is J's X marginal in DX .
3. Classical-vs. abstract HMM 's 3.1. Classical HMM 's, and single HMM -steps as matrices. Classically a Hidden Markov Model comprises a set X of states, a set Y of observations and two stochastic matrices C, M that give resp. the emission probabilities C x,y that x will emit observation y and the transition probabilities M x,x that x will change to x [12] . Usually, the homogeneous case, computation evolves in (probabilistic) steps each determined by the same C, M , with each output state x becoming the following input x and with the emissions y accumulating. In our case however, heterogeneous, we can vary the matrices from step to step, each standing for various (different) program fragments. We show two computations in Fig. 1 . If π is the distribution of incoming x, the distribution π of intermediate x is π·M 1 . The distribution of observations y 1 is π·C 1 . The second step's input x is the output of the first step.
A classical HMM hides all of three of x, x , x , but still the observations y 1,2 tell us something about each of them provided we know π, M 1,2 , C 1,2 . (This is analogous to knowing the source code of a program, but not being able to observe its variables as it executes.) From now on we call the emission part of an HMM the channel and the transition part the markov (lower case). Note that in (C;M ) the probabilistic choices in C (of y) and M (of x ) are made independently; although indeed (C;M ) has the property that for each x: X the (remaining) joint distribution (C;M ) x,−,− is independent in y, x , this property is not preserved once steps are composed ( §4).
3.2.
Abstract HMM 's represent classical HMM 's. For abstract channels ( §2.5) we focussed on the hyper of posteriors on the input; for HMM 's we focus on the hyper of posteriors on the output, because HMM 's are computations and so it is over their outputs we wish to reason. (The prior on the output would be our calculation from the input prior and the markov of what the output distribution would be, but before running the program and making observations in the type Y.) Definition 3.2 (Matrix HMM denotes abstract HMM ). Let H: X Y×X be an HMM presented as a matrix (stochastic in y, x ). Its denotation, of type DX →D 2 X , is called an abstract HMM and is defined [[H]].π:= [[J]], where π: DX and the joint-distribution matrix J: X Y is given by J x ,y := Σ x π x H x,y,x .
In §12 we discuss the (Dalenius) implications of having abstracted from the HMM 's input (with the Σ x just above) -it is not always appropriate.
3.3.
Special cases of HMM -steps: pure markovs. Markovs are the special case of HMM where the channel-part effectively outputs nothing. If an HMM -step (C;M ) has for its channel C an all-one column vector nc, where nc stands for "null channel". Then Y is a singleton and J becomes a column vector: i.e. J x = Σ x π x M x,x , so that in fact J is the usual matrix product π·M .
Taking Consider the program of Fig. 2 whose single variable is a two-bit string xs. We model it with X ={00, 01, 10, 11}; prior π: DX is uniform, and its markov M is as just below: 00 01 10 11 00:
The output distribution is of course π =π·M =π, and so the attacker's guess of the final state is optimally any of the four values in X : they are equally good.
This system viewed as an abstract HMM would give output hyper ∆ = [[:M ]].π = [π], in fact the point hyper on π indicating that the attacker is certain (point-probability 1) that the posterior distribution π on the final value of xs is equal to the prior π in this case, i.e. it is still uniform.
3.4.
Special cases of HMM -steps: pure channels. Channels are the special case where the input-and the output state are the same. If (C;M ) has markov M as the identity id, then it is a "pure channel" with output the same as its input. In that case Def. 3.2 gives J x ,y = x π x C x,y id x,x = (π C) x ,y , and so [ Fig. 3 where some of xs is leaked, but xs itself is not changed. Thus our state X and prior π are as before, the observation space is Y={0, 1} and the channel C representing this program is here at left: 
where in general we write z 1 @p 1 , z 2 @p 2 , · · · for the discrete distribution that assigns probability p 1 to z 1 etc. In (3.1) the values z 1 , z 2 are themselves (inner, posterior) distributions. This hyper shows that with probability 1 /2 an optimal attacker will guess 00 (because she saw a 0 leaked, and deduces a posteriori that 00 now has the highest probability, twice either of the others); and with probability 1 /2 the attacker will guess 11 (because she saw a 1). Remarkably, the action of HMM -composition on pure-markovs HMM 's is effectively their matrix multiplication, yet its action on pure channels is effectively their "parallel composition": thus a single general definition of composition specialises automatically to the two principal sub-cases, as we now show. First, we give the details for classical HMM 's; then Thm. 4.3 shows that the same holds for abstract HMM 's.
4.1.1.
Composition of pure markovs. The usual composition of Markov matrices M 1,2 : X X is via matrix multiplication M 1 ·M 2 , and the result is of the same type X X . If we do it at the HMM -level, we find (;M 1 );(;M 2 ) x,(y 1 ,y 2 ),
x ,x "Recall from §3.3 that channel nc reveals nothing." = (; M 1 ·M 2 ) x,(y 1 ,y 2 ),x , so that indeed (;M 1 );(;M 2 ) = (; M 1 ·M 2 ).
4.1.2.
Composition of pure channels. Parallel composition of channels, which we write C 1 C 2 , models applying both channels to the same input and observing both outputs. Thus
. This is different from channel cascading, which applies the second channel C 2 to the observations of the first channel C 1 via matrix multiplication. A striking distinction is that the cascade of C 1 into C 2 releases no more information that C 1 alone (the Data-Processing Inequality [13] ), whereas C 1 C 2 releases no less information that either of C 1,2 alone. In this latter case we find (C 1 ;);(C 2 ;) x,(y 1 ,y 2 ), so that indeed again (C 1 ;);(C 2 ;) = (C 1 C 2 ; ). 4.1.3. Pure channel followed by pure markov. Finally, note that a general HMM -step ( §3.1) is a pure channel followed by a pure markov. Let nc x,y 2 be (1 if y 2 =ŷ else 0) for some fixed y in Y, and calculate (C;);(;M ) x,(y 1 ,y 2 ),
so that (C;) ; (;M ) = (C;M ). The reason that (C;);(;M ) and (;M );(C;) differ in general is that in the (mathematical) definition of an HMM -step (e.g. Fig. 1 ) the emissions are determined by the input, initial state (rather than the output, final state). Had that original definition been the other way around, then we'd have had (;M );(C;) as an HMM -step. 4.1.4. Pure markov followed by pure channel. This cannot, in general, be reduced to a single HMM -step. In (;M ); (C;) let both C, M be the identity. Then the observations and final state will be perfectly correlated, something that is not possible for single HMM -step (C ;M ).
4.2.
Abstract HMM 's: Kleisli composition. Now we consider h 1 ; h 2 where h 1,2 are abstract HMM 's. (We use upper-case for matrices and lower-case for denotations.) Because the components' types DX →D 2 X do not match directly, i.e. the co-domain D 2 X from the left is not the domain DX required on the right, we use Kleisli composition for that. 7 Definition 4.1 (Push-forward of a function). Given sets Z, Z and function f : Z→Z , we write Df for the push-forward of f , a "lifted" function of type DZ→DZ [14] . For z : Z and δ: DZ we have 8 Df.δ.z := That is, the lifting inherent in Kleisli-composition applies the right-hand abstract HMM h 2 to each inner (i.e. posterior) produced by the left-hand h 1 from prior π, preserving the way in which they are all combined together by the outer distribution. Then the intermediate result, of type D 3 X , is averaged to bring it back to the required type D 2 X .
4.3.
Proof that composition is faithfully denoted. It is important (though unsurprising) for our interpretation that composition of HMM 's as matrices ( Proof. We reason as follows for any π. 
as required. 
which is simplified first to this
and then, since the two inners are the same, as a hyper-distribution is collapsed to just the singleton hyper [π], where we are using an explicit (×) for multiplication of specific numbers. Thus the program of Fig. 4 reveals nothing about the final value of xs when the initial distribution was uniform. Informally we would explain this by noting that the information about xs released by the leak becomes "stale", irrelevant once we do not know whether xs has subsequently been inverted or not. (See §12 however for a discussion of why the initial value of xs might in some cases still be important.)
It would be wrong however to conclude, from ∆ =[π] in this specific case, that the program is secure for xs in general -for when the initial distribution is not uniform, the final value of xs can be less secure than the initial. This illustrates the danger in assuming something is uniformly distributed simply because we know nothing about it. (See §4.4.)
We now reconsider Fig. 4 but with a non-uniform prior, showing that indeed the conclusion that the program was (wrt. the final state) "leak free" is unjustified. In Fig. 5 the initial hyper is "skewed", i.e. it is not uniform over the whole type XS of xs, but rather is concentrated on only three of its values:
so that with certainty (@1) it is known that the initial distribution is (0, 1 /3, 1 /3, 1 /3). Via the first statement leak xs[0] 1 /2 ⊕ xs [1] an attacker will with probability 1 /3 (resp. 2 /3) observe 0 (resp. 1) and revise his belief of xs's distribution as in the first (resp. second) row here: (0, 1 /2, 1 /2, 0) @ 1 /3 (0, 1 /4, 1 /4, 1 /2) @ 2 /3 This system is as in Fig. 4 except that the prior initial distribution differs: at least one bit of xs is known to be 1. Figure 5 . Simple-channel program excluding xs=00 initially.
And after the second statement xs:= xs 1 /2 ⊕ -xs the hyper for the current (and final) distribution of xs will have become (0,
where in the 1 /3-case he is better off finally than initially (since he knows xs cannot be 00 or 11), but in the other case he is worse off (since xs=00 has become possible). Thus if the attacker's choice is either to guess xs's initial value or to run the program and guess xs's final value, he can use these hypers to help make up his mind depending on his own criteria for the utility of his planned theft, that is the social context in which he is operating. Compare for example a thief's two alternatives for stealing a credit card: she might "Steal it now, since the wallet is just sitting there." or she might "Steal it after the card is used at an ATM where she can see some digit of the PIN." But in the second case there is a risk her victim will notice her, and choose a new PIN. For example, the Shannon entropy of xs is initially lg(3)∼1.6, but finally, it is conditionally 1 /3×1 + 2 /3×2 = 2 /3>1.6: if the attacker is using Shannon entropy to make his decision, he should act sooner rather than later.
On the other hand, the one-guess probability (Rényi min-entropy) of xs is initially 1 /3; and finally it is the same, at 1 /3× 1 /2 + 2 /3× 1 /4 = 1 /3. If the attacker is using this criterion, it does not matter when he acts.
In either case, the hypers (4.2) and (4.3) contain all the information necessary for his decision: the bit-values printed are themselves not important for his decision, which is why we can quotient our semantics by abstracting from them. (He does, however, need those values when he makes his attack if indeed he decides "later".)
These calculations are confirmed in the next section.
Overview of Haskell-monadic prototype
A Haskell prototype of our hyper-based monadic model has been constructed for discrete, finite HMM 's, and it has been applied to our examples of Figs. 2-5 [15] . We give a brief summary here. A discrete probability distribution on a set X is modelled as a monadic type Dist x that is effectively a list [(x,Rational)] of elements from X and their associated probabilities. The type of (discrete) hypers D 2 X is then Dist(Dist x).
A Markov "matrix" on X is of type x->Dist x, in fact encoding the matrix as a function from row-indices to distributions DX ; a channel matrix is of type x->Dist y for any type Y of observations whatever. The mini-programming language has two elementary statements: to use a markov mm we have an update mm that updates the state according to mm. Note that mm is a Markov matrix, but update mm is a markov HMM that is constructed from mm, i.e. implements it.
To use a channel cm we have a reveal cm that emits (e.g. prints) the channel's output wrt. the hidden state at that point: the state is not changed and, in particular, the output is not assigned to anything. It is merely observed. Both of these statements are of type Dist x->Dist(Dist x), modelling our DX →D 2 X . In fact they are in HX , as Lemmas The programs are run using the function runOn prior prog = pretty (prog prior) where pretty is an output-formatting function that prints hypers in a readable way. The results of running the programs are as follows, where the third column gives the outer probabilities of the resulting hyper, and the first two columns give the corresponding inner distributions. We print True,False as 1,0 respectively: (The prototype prints probabilities as fractions; but here they are printed as reals, for neatness.) 01 0.5 0.33 10 0.5 The prototype contains also a repeat feature: for example repeat 10 (reveal oneBit) is a program that reveals a random bit of xs 10 times independently. (Such an iteration of parallel compositions is sometimes called "repeated independent runs.") With the uniform prior we would expect that the resulting hyper would have three inners: one of them, occurring with probability approximately 1 /2, would correspond to the case where the input bits of xs differed, in which case with overall probability 1023 /1024 there would be two different revelations among the 10 instances -thus showing that indeed the bits differed. But we would still have no (more) information about whether the input was 01 or 10.
The remaining 1 /1024 would be split between two cases: bit xs[0] was revealed every time, or xs [1] was; and those outcomes would contribute to the other two inners.
Those other two inners would have probability approximately 1 /4 each, corresponding to input 00 or 11 where the two bits are the same. The program confirms this, giving runOn uniform (repeat 10 (reveal oneBit)) = (where this time we preserve the fractions). The small perturbations away from 1 /4 etc. reflect the small chance, mentioned above, that even when the inputs differ the random oneBit reveals the same bit 10 times in a row.
Finally, if we run the same program but with the final probabilistic inversion included, we get runOn uniform (repeat 10 (reveal oneBit) >=> update invert) = 00 256/513 513/1024 two inners merged 01 1/1026 10 1/1026 11 256/513 about 1 /2 01 1/2 511/1024 about 1 /2 10 1/2 in which the two "bits equal" inners from just above have merged: although the probabilistic inversion preserves the information concerning whether the bits are equal, it conceals in the equals case whether they were both 00 or both 11.
The structure of hyper-space
Our hyper-space D 2 X has been synthesised by abstraction from the classical "matrix style" description of HMM 's. We now recall that there is a partial order ( ) of refinement on hypers, where for two hypers ∆ S,I : D 2 X we say that ∆ S (a specification) is "refined by" ∆ I (implementation) when, in a sense we make precise below, the implementation ∆ I releases no more information than the specification ∆ S does [3] [4] [5] 8] . That order lifts pointwise to DX →D 2 X , i.e. that h S h I just when h S .π h I .π for all π: DX , thus giving a new refinement order for (abstract) HMM 's. We write ∆ S ∆ I , and call it "uncertainty refinement" if we need to distinguish it from other kinds of refinement. Its ultimate antecedent is the lattice of information [16] -but it generalises those seminal ideas significantly. Definition 6.1 (Uncertainty refinement [3, 5] ). Let ∆ S,I : D 2 X be two hypers on X . We say that ∆ S is refined by ∆ I just when there is a distribution ∆: D 3 X , that is a distribution of hypers, such that ∆ S = avg.∆ and (Davg).∆ = ∆ I .
for some stochastic refinement matrix R: Y S Y I . Note that the state-spaces of ∆ S,I are the same, but their observation spaces Y S,I can differ.
Proof. Illustrated in §C; sketch proof in §D.
With Lem. 6.2 the reflexivity and transitivity of relation ( ) is clear from elementary matrix properties. For anti-symmetry we refer to [6, Thm 6] , whose supporting Lemma 1 there is adapted to suit our purposes here:
and (×) are taken in the vector space. 11 We will be using E principally over hypers, i.e. the case Z = DX in the definition. Lemma 6.4 ((Strict) monotonicity). Given are two hypers ∆ S,I : D 2 X and a strictly concave
Proof. Proved for abstract channels in [6, Lem 1]; the proof for hypers is essentially identical.
We now have antisymmetry, because ∆ S ∆ I ∆ S and ∆ S =∆ I implies ∆ S ∆ I ∆ S whence we have from Lem. 6.4 the contradiction E ∆ S f < E ∆ I f < E ∆ S f for any strictly concave f : DX →R ≥ of our choice (for example Shannon entropy).
Hyper-space D 2 X also admits a metric, the Kantorovich metric [17] based on the Manhattan metric on DX ( §7). It is used for continuity properties (as we will see in §8.1), and is chosen because of its hierarchical properties, i.e. that the Kantorovich metric on say X induces a metric on DX and D 2 X etc. [17] .
Monads: Giry, Kleisli and Kantorovich
With DX →D 2 X we have given a discrete model of abstract HMM 's, suitable for interpreting probabilistic sequential programs with hidden state, together with concrete programming examples (Figs. [2] [3] [4] . We now provide a brief overview about how our setup embeds into structures based on a Giry monad.
The Giry monad over the category of Polish spaces and continuous functions comprises an endofunctor Π and two natural transformations η (unit) and µ (multiply) [2] ; following [1] we take that as a basis for the denotation of computations. More precisely, we restrict 10 Recall that the X here in type X YS is the final-, not the initial state. 11 More generally it is f dδ and requires measurability of f . One reason we do not use the standard notation E(X) for the expected value of random variable X is that the distribution over which X is taken is implicit. In the calculations our HMM -semantics entails, we often need to make it explicit. ourselves to the category Comp of compact metric spaces and continuous functions. We have been using D as a specialisation of Π to this case. The object DS is the set of Borel probability measures over the compact metric space S which is indeed a compact metric space [18, Thm 6.4] . To form a monad on Comp, we have provided the unit-function [·] specialising η that makes a point measure, and multiply-function avg specialising µ that takes the average of a distribution (of distributions). Typically we have [·] DX ∈DX →D 2 X and avg X ∈D 2 X →DX where the subscripts are left implicit when they are clear from the context. From Giry's construction, the arrows [·] S and avg S are continuous with respect to the weak topology on DS but, in this paper, we are dealing with compact metric spaces. Fortunately, for compact metric spaces, the Kantorovich distance metrizes the weak topology [19] . This implies that the triple (D, [·], avg) is indeed a monad on the category Comp.
Monadic constructions based on the Kantorovich metric are not new. In [17] , Van Breugel construct monads on the category Comp* of compact metric spaces and 1-Lipschitz functions. His functor B coincides with our D on objects and he shows that Bf , [·] S and avg S are 1-Lipschitz; whenever f is 1-Lipschitz and S is a compact metric space. Thus (B, [·], avg) is a monad on the category Comp* 12 . In that work, the metric is crucial since the notion of 1-Lipschitzness is not a topological property. In fact, Van Breugel shows that the Kantorovich metric is the right metric to construct probabilistic monads out of metric spaces. Such a construction does not necessarily work with other metrics that metrizes the weak topology (e.g. Prohorov metric which is equivalent to the Kantorovich metric from compact spaces). However, arrows in the category Comp* are insufficient to denote probabilistic programs with hidden states because [[C]] is not necessarily 1-Lipschitz for some channel matrix C. This drives our choice of the Giry monad (D, [·], avg) on the category Comp of compact metric spaces and continuous functions.
Our construction of the Kantorovich metric begins with a finite set X endowed with the discrete metric d 1 (i.e. d 1 (x, x ):= 0 if x=x else 1). This is trivially a compact metric space. The space DX of discrete distributions on X is endowed with the Kantorovich metric based on d 1 which coincides with the total variation metric on DX . At this level, the Kantorovich metric reduces to
At the next level, our hyper-space D 2 X has the Borel algebra generated by D from DX , which is in turn determined by the Kantorovich metric derived from d K which we will also denote by d K . These metrics are distinguished in terms of the arguments they are applied on, i.e. Sometimes called "healthiness conditions", these are essentially technical results giving general properties that are to hold for the denotation of any program. They are used for the 12 Note that Van Breugel's construction is more general than this since he also considers complete metric spaces and tight probability measures over them. 
x,y |. Furthermore, since π →(π J) comprises only elementary arithmetic operations, and d K is topologically equivalent to the Euclidean distance, the continuity is clear. Thus we concentrate on the continuity of [[·]] at an arbitrary joint distribution J: D(X ×Y).
Let ε>0. We denote [[J]] = ∆ and let J : D(X ×Y) with [[J ]] = ∆ . Since J and J are matrices, we can write ∆ = y a y [δ y ] and ∆ = y a y [δ y ] with δ y , δ y : DX . These are sums over the full set Y so if a y = 0 (resp. a y = 0) then we define δ y := δ y (resp. δ y := δ y ). Let us define ∆ = y a y [δ y ] which combines the coefficients of ∆ with the inners of ∆ . The triangular inequality tells us that
On the one hand, 
On the other hand, for every y, the function which maps J to δ y is continuous at J since it is a composition of a y-projection and normalisation. Therefore, there exists α y >0 such that for every J :
" y a y = 1 and a y ≥0 for all y"
Therefore, we choose β = min(min y α y , ε 2 ) and for every J such that
Hence, [[·]
] is continuous at J.
Our second condition concerns linear combinations.
Definition 8.2 (Weighted sum). For δ 1,2 : DX we write δ 1p +δ 2 for the weighted sum of the two distributions, so that (δ p +δ ) x = pδ x + (1−p)δ x . Note that δ p +δ defined here and the δ p ⊕δ of Def. 2.10 differ: the former is a single distribution made from p-merging δ, δ ; the latter is a hyper whose support is just the two elements δ, δ . 
where ( ) is refinement as defined in Def. 6.1. 13
Proof. Take any reduced J 1,2 : X Y, and argue first that for any 0≤p≤1 we have 
that simply sums corresponding columns. Now we observe that Since we will therefore be restricting our denotations to HX , a subset of the arrows in the category Comp, we expect HX to be closed under composition. Proof. Although a direct proof is possible, the result is much easier once we have introduced "uncertainty" transformers ( §9), because it is then a consequence of Thm. 9.8 and in particular its Cor. 9.9, which depends crucially on the dual view we develop in §9.
It is shown in §E.2 that composition in HX is monotonic with respect to the refinement order ( ). This completes our construction of our forward, abstract semantics for HMM 's. We now propose a dual view. 13 Super-linearity can also be seen as a form of monotonicity. See §E.1. , the functions from distributions to reals that measure increasing disorder.
Definition 9.1 (Uncertainty measure). An uncertainty measure over X is a Kantorovichcontinuous-and concave function in DX → R ≥ , i.e. one taking distributions (on X in this case) to non-negative reals. It is intended that a distribution's greater uncertainty indicates more resilience (less vulnerability) to the distribution's being exploited by an adversary. 14 We write UX for the uncertainty measures over X , and call them "UM 's" in the text for brevity.
A typical example of a UM applied to a hyper is as follows. Given prior π: DX and channel C: X Y, the resulting hyper is ∆:= [[π C]] and the "conditional u uncertainty" of that (compare conditional Shannon entropy) would be E ∆ u. We write E ∆ u because it makes explicit that the conditional uncertainty is an expected value and, as such, we can calculate with it. (More conventional notations such as H(y|x) -in the Shannon case-make those calculations more difficult.) This could be compared to the uncertainty u.π of the prior, to give a "u-leakage" of the channel on that prior.
There is a compelling connection between UM 's (Def. 9.1) and refinement (Def. 6.1, Lem. 6.2): we have Lemma 9.2 (Soundness and completeness of uncertainty measures [6] ). For any hypers ∆ 1,2 : D 2 X we have
We regard "only if" as soundness in the sense that if we have a witness to the refinement relation ∆ 1 ∆ 2 , i.e. either ∆ (Def. 6.1) or R (Lem. 6.2), then no UM can show ∆ 2 to be less uncertain than ∆ 1 . It is related to the Data-Processing Inequality, as explained in [6] .
We regard "if" as completeness in the sense that if refinement fails, that is if ∆ 1 ∆ 2 , then there is a UM demonstrating the failure [4] [5] [6] 8] .
In §E.5 is background on the proof of Lem. 9.2, whose completeness part was originally called "Coriaceous" because it was hard to prove [8] .
9.2. Abstract HMM 's to UM -transformers. In §3 we introduced a "forward" denotational view of HMM 's that takes initial distributions to final hypers. Here we take the dual view, where an HMM takes a "post-uncertainty" to a "pre-uncertainty". where on the right we are taking the expected value of u on the hyper h.π. (Because u is continuous, it is measurable.) 14 Smith's "vulnerability measure" based on Bayes Risk [9] is an uncertainty measure except that it goes in the opposite direction. By analogy with weakest preconditions for ordinary sequential programming [20] , a UMtransformer wp.h takes a UM to be applied after h and produces a UM that equivalently can be applied before h. (Compare also [21] [22] [23] for probabilistic/demonic sequential programs.) The idea (and utility) is in goal-directed reasoning: if one knows the program, and knows also the uncertainty that it must achieve, with the uncertainty transformer one determines the minimum uncdertainty that is necessary before the program begins its execution.
In Lem. 9.4 we show well definedness of Def. 9.3, that is that wp.h.u is indeed in UX . Lemma 9.5 (wp.h is linear and total). For every h: HX and t = wp.h we have that t is:
(1) linear so that for a 1,2 : R ≥ and u 1,2 : UX we have t.(a 1 u 1 + a 2 u 2 ) = a 1 t.u 1 + a 2 t.u 2 ;
(2) monotonic, so that t.u 1 .δ ≥ t.u 2 .δ for every u 1 ≥u 2 with u 1,2 : UX and δ: DX , where we lift (≥) pointwise; and (3) total, so that t.1=1 where 1.δ:= 1 for all δ: DX .
Proof. These properties are immediate from Def. 9.3.
A further property of UM -transformers is that they are 1-Lipshitz in a certain sense: Lemma 9.6 (wp.h is 1-Lipschitz). Take h: HX and define t:= wp.h. Let |·| be absolute value. Then t is 1-Lipschitz in the sense that
Proof. Consider arbitrary u 1,2 : UX . We reason
"E h.δ 1 = 1 and rename δ to δ"
Motivated by those lemmas, we define uncertainty transformers to be exactly the functions in UX →UX that satisfy the properties listed.
Definition 9.7 (The uncertainty transformers TX ). The uncertainty transformers TX are the functions in UX →UX that satisfy Lems. 9.5,9.6.
We note that transformers TX are closed under composition. In §E.3 we show that refinement for TX is pointwise (≤). 9.4. UM -transformers back to abstract HMM 's. The function wp.(·) has been shown to be of type HX →TX . Here we show that this correspondence is exact, i.e. that for every t: TX there is an h: HX such that t=wp.h and, moreover, that the h is unique.
The following theorem thus establishes the exact correspondence between HX and TX , giving an analogue for hidden-state probabilistic programs to the well-known correspondence between demonic relations and conjunctive predicate transformers [20] that the former correspond exactly to those functions from predicates to predicates that distribution conjunction. (A further example, generalising that, is the correspondence between demonic/probabilistic programs and super-linear expectation transformers [22, 24] .) Theorem 9.8 (Characterisation of transformers). For any t: TX there is a unique h: HX such that t=wp.h.
Proof. Let t: T. The construction of h starts by showing that the transformer t can be extended into a linear function over the space CX of continuous functions from DX to itself. This extension is executed in two phases. Firstly, we show that the set UX of continuous, concave and non-negative function over DX generates a sub-vector space of CX . Thus, the first stage is an algebraic extension of t to that generated sub-space. This extension is necessarily unique by linearity (Lem. 9.5). The second stage is a topological extension where CX is endowed with the norm uniform making it a Banach space. In fact, we show that the sub-vector space generated by UX is a dense sub-algebra of CX using the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem [25, Thm. 5] . Thus the second stage of the extension is also unique by continuity. Full technical details of these extensions are given in §G.
We now have a unique continuous linear functiont from CX to itself which coincides with t on UX . We shall construct an h such that wp.h = t. Continuity: For the continuity assumption in Lem. 8.1, we let δ n be a sequence of distributions in DX converging to δ: DX with respect to the Kantorovich metric on DX . It suffices to show that the limit of d K (h.δ n , h.δ) is 0, as n goes to infinity. Since DX is compact, the Kantorivich metric metrizes the weak topology and it suffices to show that h.δ n converges weakly to the Borel measure h.δ. Let f : CX , we have
Sincet.f is also continuous, the sequencet.f.δ n converges tot.f.δ and thus, h.δ n coverges weakly to h.δ. 15 Super-linear: For the super-linearity assumption in Lem. 8.3, suppose that t=wp.h is in TX and take arbitrary δ 1,2 : DX . Then we reason 15 This proof crucially depends on the compactness of DX . For Polish spaces, we can achieve the same result but using a more general result by Rao which was our assumption.
With these characterisations, we now can prove two technical facts. In the discrete case (as earlier) they seem self-evident. In the more general setting, however, the work is mainly in ensuring well definedness (e.g. that only measurable functions are integrated, etc.) The first establishes the usual connection between composition, this time between the forwardand backward semantics; the second confirms that HX is closed under composition (i.e. preserves continuity and super-linearity, as claimed in Lem. 8.5). Also, transformer composition respects refinement ( §E.4).
Gain-and loss functions define uncertainty measures
10.1. Gain-and loss functions. Although Def. 9.1 of uncertainty measures is abstract, they can be made concrete via "gain functions" [8] or equivalently "loss functions" [4, Eqn. (5) ] that encode an attacker's (e.g.) economic interest in the secrets and the cost of obtaining them. We use loss functions here.
Definition 10.1 (Loss function determines uncertainty measure). A loss function is of type I→X →R ≥ for some index set I, with the intuitive meaning that .i.x is the cost to the attacker of using "attack strategy" i when the hidden value turns out actually to be x. Her expected cost for an attack planned but not yet carried out is then E δ ( .i) if δ is the distribution in DX she believes to be governing x currently.
From such an we define an uncertainty measure
When I is finite, the inf can be replaced by min.
The inf represents a rational strategy of minimising cost or risk, and a typical attacker will act as follows: she chooses the attack strategy (i.e. he chooses i) whose expected cost E ρ ( .i) to her, where ρ is the posterior in DX she infers from her observations in Y, will be the least. Proof. We give here the proof for the finite-I case. (The infinite case is considered in [7, Sec III-B]; it might require further assumptions on I.) Let be a loss function and U be the associated uncertainty measure.
U is concave: Take ρ 1,2 : DX and p: [0, 1]. We have
U l is continuous: Since I is finite and each function (λρ · E ρ .i) = (λρ · x: X ρ x × .i.x) is continuous, the function U is also continuous.
Remarkably, loss functions are complete for uncertainty measures: any uncertainty measure in UX can be expressed as U for some loss function in I→X →R ≥ , but possibly requiring I to be infinite [27] . Roughly speaking, this is because of the way concave functions can be expressed as the envelope of their tangential hyperplanes: the coefficients of the hyperplanes' normals are the loss functions. 16 It is compellingly shown elsewhere how versatile loss (equiv. gain) functions are [8] . Of particular interest is that Lem. 9.2 applies, both in the discrete [4] and the continuous cases [5] , even when uncertainties are restricted to those generated by loss functions: the "distinguishing witness" constructed for completeness is in fact a loss function [4] . 11 . A UM -transformer example for §4.4 11.1. Profiling an attacker with a loss function. In the context of Fig. 4 we imagine an attacker whose livelihood depends on her guessing whether xs[0]=xs [1] or not, finally. If he guesses incorrectly he loses $1; if correctly, he breaks even (loses $0). This is as much a mathematical-as a social issue: attacks will be discouraged if they are not worthwhile for the attacker in terms of her own criteria. (See also §4.4 for this social aspect.)
In this example, following §10, we express the attacker's criteria as two strategies "guess same" and "guess different" (thus I = {same, diff}) and a loss function therefore defined based on the informal description just above: for example if xs=01 but he guesses same, the case indicated by †, then he loses $1; but if he guesses diff, he breaks even ‡. Using (10.1) we define our UM as u.δ = U .δ = .same.δ min .diff.δ = E δ ( .same) min E δ ( .diff) = (δ 00 +δ 11 ) min (δ 01 +δ 10 ) . 16 For example, Shannon entropy requires infinite I, and the encoding is then related to minimising the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Fig. 4 , we have for any π that wp.[[P ]].u.π = π 00 min (π 01 +π 10 )/2 + π 11 min (π 01 +π 10 )/2 . Now let π 4 be the prior described by the initial comment in Fig. 4 . The attacker's (expected) uncertainty wrt. the final hyper [[P ]].π 4 is given by wp. [[P ] ].u applied to that initial (uniform) prior π 4 , that is wp.[[P ]].u.π 4 = 1 /2 directly from (11.1). Since u.π 4 is also 1 /2, he is indifferent wrt. whether he should attack before or after P has been allowed to run. Now suppose that xs[0]=1 is known initially, thus with prior π being (0, 0, 1 /2, 1 /2) so that u applied initially gives u.π= 1 /2. But u applied finally would give wp.[[P ]].u.π = (0 min 1 /4) + ( 1 /2 min 1 /4) = 1 /4 < 1 /2, so that it is better to attack later even though xs might have been altered by P . This scenario confirms that in fact for some priors, the program in Fig. 4 cannot be regarded as secure.
HMM 's and the Dalenius Desideratum
Our abstracting from initial-state correlations allows a semantics for programs' final states alone. Sometimes, however, leakage from the initial state is important, even if that state is overwritten by the markov part of the HMM : what the initial state was might reveal information about what some other correlated state still is, even if that other state is not mentioned in the program at all. This general concern was raised wrt. statistical databases by Dalenius [10] who argued that it is inescapable; Dwork later gave a proof of this [11] .
Here is an (edited) extract from her paper:
Suppose we have a statistical database that [records] average heights of population subgroups, and suppose further that it is infeasible to learn this information (perhaps for financial reasons) in any other way (say, by conducting a new study). Finally, suppose that one's true height is considered sensitive.
[An adversary having the] auxiliary information "Turing is two inches taller than the average Lithuanian woman" [would, with access to the database, learn] Turing's height. In contrast, anyone without access to the database, knowing only the auxiliary information, learns much less about Turing's height.
With our constructions here, we are able to see the Dalenius effect in programming terms. The program that allows access to Dwork's database of Lithuanian heights (as above) might itself, in isolation, have been analysed for security leaks. But if that program is run in a larger programming context in which there is a (to be kept secret) variable tHeight containing Turing's height and there is program code (external to the database-access code) that establishes a correlation between the two, then running the database-access program reveals information about tHeight even though that variable is not mentioned anywhere in the database program.
In more austere terms, we would explain the effect as follows. A "classical" sequential program does not affect variables to which it does not refer; for example x:= E does not affect some other variable y in any way. But the program leak x (recalling the notation of Fig. 3 ) can affect what we know about variable y even though the program leak x does not refer to y at all. Consider for example an input distribution (0, 0)@ 1 /2, (1, 1)@ 1 /2 on two variables (x,y). Its y-marginal distribution is uniform on {0, 1}. But the output hyper of that program, projected onto y, is [0]@ 1 /2, [1]@ 1 /2, showing that the distribution on y is now a point, no longer uniform: 17 with probability 1 /2 that point will be [0], and with probability 1 /2 that point will be [1] . Reviewing the leaks of x tells us which point distribution on y we have, and we see essentially the Dalenius effect between "database" x, "query" leak x and "third-party data" y.
This effect is exacerbated when we include state updates, as we have done with our abstract HMM 's here. (Updates were not considered originally by Dalenius or by Dwork.) For then the program leak x; x:= 0 and the program x:= 0 have the same abstract-HMM semantics on state-space (just) x, but different semantics on state-space x,y. 18 The Dalenius effect has become, in programming terms, a failure of compositionality wrt. unreferenced global variables.
We show in this section how to deal with that: in brief, we include both the initial-and the final values of the state in our semantics. The crucial point is that we do not have to do more than that, in particular that we do not have to consider "all possible third-party data y of any type".
We now address the details. Consider a "constant" overwrite-by-
for any channel C, because C has no effect on our knowedge of the final state. We know already what it is going to be.
We now adjust the semantics so that leakage from the initial state is accounted for, even if it is subsequently overwritten. Let C: X Y be a channel and M : X X a markov, as usual, and let Z be fresh. Write C ×Z in (X ×Z) Y for the expanded channel (C ×Z ) (x,z),y := C x,y , i.e. that C ignores z. Similarly M ×Z : (X ×Z) (X ×Z) is given by
i.e. so that M does not change x. Thus these definitions ensure that for any π: D(X ×Z) neither π (C ×Z ) nor π (M ×Z ) depends on the Z component. Take for example Z:= {z 0 , z 1 } consider C, M as below: 
The definitions above show that in C ×Z the rows of the original C are each repeated 2=#Z times; and the subsequent update by M ×Z leaves Z unchanged. Observe that these definitions now account for information flows with respect to initial distributions D(X ×Z) where, crucially, the Z component is merely "carried along". But it captures the Dalenius effect mentioned, as we now explain.
Consider an initial distribution π: D(X ×Z) such that π x i ,z j = 1 if and only if i=j, i.e. that z is a copy of x's initial value. We see that, even though Z is not accessed by the program at all, if ever y 1 is observed then the Z component must certainly be z 1 , and if y 0 is observed then it is 4 times more likely to be z 0 than z 1 .
Although Z is arbitrary, it can be shown that this Dalenius effect on any Z can be determined by the HMM semantics specifically in the case where X =Z as just above. That is, we do not have to consider "all Z's", which would be impractical. Note the construction of a fully compositional semantics for programs with hidden states is requires further extensive conceptual and technical work which we have developed elsewhere [28] .
Related work
There is great diversity in approaches to information flow in (probabilistic) programs, which we have surveyed in our own earlier work [4] [5] [6] [7] . Here we have concentrated on general techniques for semantic constructions, in particular those based on monads, duality and refinement.
Refinement of probabilistic programs appeared in [29] where evaluations were used to construct a powerdomain for probabilistic but possibly non-terminating computations; this was extended to include demonic choice in the discrete case in [22, 24] , and was significantly generalised in [30] . Our "uncertainty refinement" that combines information flow with functional properties first appeared for information flow in straight-line programs in [4] , was extended to general measure spaces [5] and appeared independently for the specific case of channels [8] . Whereas Jones and Plotkin began with an underlying partial order over which to construct a probability space, our uncertainty-refinement order begins "one level up", using hyper-distributions D 2 X to encode an "attack model" that accounts for information flow.
Doberkat defines stochastic relations that correspond to forward-semantic functions of type X →DX for Markov processes: these are what we generalise by going "one level up". The converse of those stochastic relations [31] might improve the presentation of our Def. 2.7, where a hyper is extracted from a channel and a prior, i.e. from a joint distribution.
Dual models for program semantics include [20] , then for probabilistic programs [21, 23] in the purely probabilistic case. Subsequently [22] added demonic choice. And [30, 32] study dual models for probability and nondeterminism using a version of Riesz's representation theorem.
In particular, Goubault-Larrecq's approach [32] to combining probability and nondeterminism differs from our earlier work [22] . It uses general denotations for probabilistic programs in which nondeterminism is introduced at the level of measures (by weakening the Figure 6 . Relationship between the semantic spaces. modularity law) rather than as healthy sets of measures [22, 24, 30] . That leads naturally to a backward semantics of probabilistic demonic programs because nondeterminism is captured within integration. There is thus a strong analogy between our UM -transformers and Goubault-Larrecq's "previsions" because both are continuous functionals that act on some set of tests (bounded continuous functions). The main difference is that our UM -transformers are specifically tailored to capture security semantics, which is what leads to concavity on our set of uncertainty measures. Notice moreover that Goubault-Larrecq encounters a difficulty similar to our composition of HMM 's, that the decomposition [[C:M ]] (resp. collinearity) is not preserved by Giry composition. Indeed, both difficulties are resolved by working in a larger space, namely, the space of abstract HMM 's (resp. not-necessarily-collinear continuous previsions).
In [33] a dual model for Markov processes is used to prove properties about approximations of finite behaviours, and in [34] it is shown how expectation transformers relate to explicit program models described by Markov processes.
Recently Jacobs and Hasuo have explored a general categorical construction of a backward transformer semantics from a forward monadic model of probabilistic computations (discrete, continuous and quantum) [35, 36] . Their construction uses measurability as the underlying feature of "predicates", while the stronger condition of continuity is crucial for our uncertainty measures. It would be interesting to see whether an instantiation of that categorical derivation can provide more structure for what we have done.
The concave functions advocated here for analysing information-flow properties have appeared in [5, 8] and have been identified in [37] as an ingredient in privacy analysis.
Conclusions and prospects
Our principal objective was to provide an abstract setting for HMM 's based on well understood principles of semantic spaces. We did that using Giry's general monadic framework applied at the level of DX (rather than X ); the resulting structures include a refinement order which is sensitive to both functional and information-flow properties, and they lead to a dual, transformer space supported by theorems demonstrating the duality. Fig. 6 summarises the results: framework, and suggested how it can be treated: recall §12. • We stated and proved Thm. 9.8, which we believe is a significant new result, in particular its assumptions and proof. More abstractly (recall §1.2), we aimed to profit by joining two ideas: the established use of HMM 's as descriptions of probabilistic mechanisms having hidden state, and the established use of monads for modelling computations. Our novel use of DX in the monad, rather than the state X itself, is the principal innovation that allowed this; and the synthesised hyper-distribution space that results leads to other advantages (the two †'s below).
An immediate benefit accrues because, in monad-enabled programming languages, probabilistic-programming packages can be built very quickly and e.g. [38] More importantly, any monad brings with it both general equational properties and specific properties applying to the monad in question (such as those in [2] ). These conceptual tools allow reasoning about the structures modelled (HMM 's in this case) in ways that would be obscured by their more direct operational representation (e.g. as matrices).
• The other advantages of hypers are several: one is that they abstract from differences between entropies in a way that allows all of the entropies to be used uniformly. For example, a hyper contains all the information necessary to calculate the information leakage of a particular program fragment (typically, in the security literature, a pure channel §3.4), as shown in [6] , and furthermore the Kantorovich-metric structure of DX we used earlier for channels [7] now carries over to HMM 's. • Another advantage of hypers is that their partial-order enables semantics for "looping HMM 's" in the standard way (least fixed-point) for computer science, rather than a direct ad-hoc definition based on matrices. Indeed a typical use of HMM 's is to run a single HMM -step ( §3.1) repeatedly and then to make statistical deductions about its hidden features: sophisticated mathematical tools are available for this special case [12] . Via abstract HMM 's we can however, in principle, handle complex, heterogeneous systems beyond (what amounts to, in the special case just above) a single loop containing just a single statement. Our more concrete aim (again §1.2) was to allow source-level reasoning about probabilistic programs with hidden state. Historically at the source level this works best with backwards reasoning based on predicates (or similar) that can be embedded between program statements rather than forwards reasoning which, here, would be calculations using DX →D 2 X directly.
Here our "predicates" are UM 's, which in this paper however are mathematical objects unsuitable for embedding directly in program texts (see §I, last paragraph) As remarked in §10.1, however, any UM can be expressed as U l for some loss-function l which function -crucially-is indeed an expression based on program variables [27] . The added complexity introduced by the hidden state is that the program-logic based on that observation must represent the index-set (I) of the loss function; that would most likely be done by adding a special-purpose quantifier (since the loss-function index must be a bound variable within the assertion, not appearing in the program proper).
Exploiting this opportunity for a source-level quantitative logic of probabilistic hidden state is planned for future work. From that we can deduce that for any pure abstract markov h the effect of avg • h (on some π) is matrix multiplication by some M (independent of π). That is, for any 0≤p≤1 we have (avg • h).(π 1p +π 2 ) = (avg • h).π 1 p + (avg • h).π 2 , (B.1) which property characterises matrix multiplication. This is because h.(π 1p +π 2 )=[ρ] and h.π 1,2 =[ρ 1,2 ] resp. for some ρ, ρ 1,2 , together with Lem. 8.3, gives
[ρ] , and the only way that can hold is if ρ = ρ 1p +ρ 2 , which is precisely the claim made at (B.1) just above. B.2. Pure abstract channels. A pure channel is one that releases information about the distribution on X but does not change it: one can think of the transformation part as the identity matrix. Thus (B.1) above suggests that we should have that avg • h is the identity for a pure channel, i.e. that avg.(h.π)=π. This is necessary, but turns out not to be sufficient: we explore a fuller characterisation of channels later ( §J).
Appendix C. Equivalent presentations of refinement: Lem. 6.2
[ §6]
Lem. 6.2 concerned two definitions of uncertainty refinement, showing them to be equivalent: one was formulated for joint distributions (defined at (6.1) within the lemma), suitable for discrete reasoning; and the other was formulated for hypers (Def. 6.1), suitable for extension to more general reasoning (e.g. proper measures). We sketch the proof of that equivalence in §D immediately below.
In this section however we present an example, two hypers ∆ S,I shown to satisfy ∆ S ∆ I in both presentations (Def. 6.1, Lem. 6.2), with an explanation of how to move from one presentation to the other.
As in (3.1) of §3.4, we use the following notation for discrete distributions where specific values in the support are named: we write
If these are laid out horizontally, we enclose them in double set-brackets {{· · ·}} separated by commas: thus {{H@ 2 /3, T @ 1 /3}} describes a coin twice as likely to give heads as tails. If the double brackets are used without probabilities (and thus also without @'s) then the intended distribution is uniform, so that {{H, T }} describes a fair coin; a convenient special case of that is {{H}} for the point distribution on H, the coin that gives heads every time. 19 Let X be the set {H, T } of coin-flip results. We choose our two hypers as follows, presenting them as at (C.1):
 
The first hyper ∆ S represents choosing fairly between two biased coins and having the chosen one secretly flipped: we know which coin was flipped, but we are not allowed to see the outcome of the flip. In ∆ I however we choose fairly between three coins: the two biased coins from before, and a fair one. Again the chosen one is secretly flipped; again we are not allowed to see the outcome.
We argue that in any reasonable measure of secrecy, it should in the second case ∆ I be harder to guess which of H, T resulted from the flip than in the first case ∆ S . And it is precisely that non-specific "in any reasonable measure" that uncertainty refinement ∆ S ∆ I attempts to capture. 20 In this case, and informally speaking, ∆ I is more secure than ∆ S because there is now a third possible case that acts as a linear combination of the existing two. That is, some of the separation between the inners H2 /3 ⊕T and H1 /3 ⊕T in the support of ∆ S has been merged together to become a single inner H1 /2 ⊕T in the support of ∆ I -and what makes the observer more uncertain is that he doesn't know how to pull that single inner apart again.
Two (reduced) joint matrices J S,I that give ∆ S,I resp. are
where the observation spaces are Y S ={a, b} and Y I ={c, d, e} respectively. (the column names are arbitrary.) Now the refinement matrix that establishes (according to Lem. 6 
which, read columnwise, says in its column c that to make Column c of J I you take 2 /3 of Column a of J S and none of Column b of J S . The middle column d of R is where the actual refinement lies, that Column d of J I is made by adding 1 /6 of each of Columns a, b of J S together. This is where J I (equiv. ∆ I ) reveals less than J S (equiv. ∆ S ) does about the distribution on X ={H, T }. And, as the lemma suggests, we indeed have J S ·R = J I . The alternative, more abstract presentation of this is in terms of Def. 6.1, i.e. where the ∆ we are looking for, that establishes ∆ S ∆ I at the hyper-level directly, can be given as (the denotation of) a joint distribution J: DX Y I itself: we will have ∆:= [[J]] which, because J's source type is DX , will have type D 2 (DX ) = D 3 X as we expect from [[·]]. The rows of J will be labelled by the support of ∆ S , i.e. it will have only two rows so that we have J = c d e H2 /3 ⊕T : 1 /3 1 /6 0 H1 /3 ⊕T :
If on the other hand we were to write ∆=[[J]] as a hyper directly (performing the various normalisations etc.) we would have
with each inner here corresponding to a row of (C.2). Now avg.∆ is given by the calculation 20 Furthermore, the powerful "Coriaceous" completeness property (Lem. 9.2) shows the dual result: if some ∆S, ∆I are not in the refinement relation, that is ∆S ∆I , then there is guaranteed to be a uncertainty measure wrt. to which ∆I is not more secure than ∆S. 
This can also be seen (indeed is easier to see) if we simply take the left-marginal of J, for which you add the columns together: you get
For the other direction we obtain (Davg).∆ by avg'ing each inner of ∆ while preserving the (outer) probabilities. 21 That gives And so that the remaining question is "How do we get such a ∆ from a given R? "
Remember that the support of ∆ S is {H2 /3 ⊕T, H1 /3 ⊕T }. Make a distribution π S by mapping those (inner) distributions of ∆ S onto the labels in Y S associated uniquely with them in J S . (The association is unique because J S is reduced.) That gives us that π S is of type DY S and has value a1 /2 ⊕b. Now form the joint-distribution matrix π S R, i.e.
Now use the relabelling in the reverse direction on the rows of the joint distribution above (as "new row-labels" at right above) to get a matrix with the same contents but now of type DX Y I . It is c d e H2 /3 ⊕T : 1 /3 1 /6 0 H1 /3 ⊕T : 0 1 /6 1 /3 which is exactly the J we had at (C.2) above, and as above we get ∆ via ∆=[[J]].
Thus in this example we have illustrated how one might move between the two equivalent definitions of refinement. Each one has a witness: in the hyper-formulation it is the distribution on hypers ∆; and in the matrix formulation is is a post-processing "refinement matrix" R. The sketch proof ( §D) shows how to obtain each from the other in general.
Appendix D. Monadic vs. matrix presentations of refinement
In §C we gave an example of the two equivalent presentations of refinement; here we give a proof (sketch) that it can always be done. Lemma 6.2: Refinement of joint-distribution matrices Let J S : X Y S and J I : X Y I be joint-distribution matrices, both of them reduced in the sense of Def. 2.7, such that [[J S,I ]]=∆ S,I resp. In this section only we use X as a reminder that the input side of these J's, their row-indices, is actually the output side of the HMM 's from which they are derived, i.e. that J x ,y = x H x,y,x as in Def. 3.2.
We prove the equivalence
Proof. First we note that for any reduced joint distribution matrix J: Z Z there is a one-one correspondence between J's column labels, i.e. elements of Z , and the support of the hyper ∆=[[J]] that J defines: it is the function j: Z Now for arbitrary x: X and y I : [ §8.1] Super-linearity (Lem. 8.3) is equivalently ( )-monotonicity of the Kleisli-extension h † of any h: HX ; that is, it is equivalent to the more general ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ⇒ h † .∆ 1 h † .∆ 2 . Assuming ( )monotonicity and recalling that [·] is the point distribution, we have trivially the inequality [π 1 ] p +[π 2 ] [π 1p +π 2 ] and so h.
For the other direction (sketch), in the discrete case we note that a proof of ∆ 1 ∆ 2 can be broken down into a succession of column-merges (in the matrix representation), each of them being of the form "replace [π 1 ] p +[π 2 ] by [π 1p +π 2 ]". 36 [ §9.4] Here we prove the correspondence between the forwards-and the backwards manifestations of refinement ( ), i.e. that we have
where on the rhs we have extended (≤) pointwise, i.e. meaning wp.h 1 .u.π ≤ wp.h 1 .u.π for all u: UX and π: DX . We reason h 1 h 2 iff h 1 .π h 2 .π for all π: DX "pointwise extension ( )" [ §9.4] For t 1,2 : UX we have defined t 1 t 2 to be simply that t 1 .u≤t 2 .u for all u: UX . Here we show that functional composition of transformers respects that refinement order ( ) on both sides, i.e. that for t, t 1,2 : TX we have both
In fact it is trivial from the property (imposed by TX ) that transformers are (≤)monotonic, that is Lem. 9.5(2). E.5. Soundness and completeness: Lem. 9.2.
[ §9] We mention soundness and completeness in this paper because it provides an important justification for our definition and use of the general uncertainty measures and, in particular, their transformers.
The soundness part of Lem. 9.2 is related to the Data-Processing Inequality, the DPI [13] , which concerns two channels C: X Y and R: Y Z. (Note that the channel R here takes the observations Y of Channel C as its input. Our HMM 's do not take observations as input.)
Informally stated, the cascade of C and R is the channel given by the matrix multiplication C·R, and the DPI states that the information leakage from C·R cannot be more than the leakage from C alone: adding another child to the game "Chinese Whispers" cannot make the eventual output less ridiculous.
We call this soundness because it states that a no-less-secure hyper wrt. our uncertainty refinement order indeed cannot be less uncertain when tested with any uncertainty measure. This result is proved in in [6, 8] .
The completeness part of Lem. 9.2 is related to the "Coriaceous Conjecture" partially proved in [8] , which became the Coriaceous Property (CP ) in [6] when its proof, for channels, was presented in complete form based on McIver's earlier, complete proof in [4] for hypers. 22 In [6] terms, the CP is that if there is no R such that C 1 ·R=C 2 then there is a "gain function" (for us here, a loss function, which determines a special form of uncertainty measure in our terms) that is witness to the non-existence of such an R. The importance of the CP for quantitative information-flow security was explained in [8] , and it was proved there to hold for many interesting special cases of C 1,2 . But not for all of them.
The CP was proved to extend beyond the discrete case, to proper measure spaces, in [5] .
Appendix F. The core ingredient in the proof of this theorem is the Riesz Representation Theorem for linear functionals (linear maps from a normed vector space to R). A difficulty however originates from the fact that the representation theorem is stated on the space of all continuous functions CX (defined below), but our linear function t is defined only from the subspace UX to itself.
Definition G.1 (Space of continuous functions). We define CX to be the set of all continuous functions from DX (with the Kantorovich metric) to R (with the ordinary metric). This set is endowed with the uniform metric · − · ∞ , defined
that turns CX into a complete metric space.
Yet UX is a sub-metric space of CX under the uniform metric ·−· ∞ . More importantly, we prove that the vector space generated by UX is dense in CX . (See Lem. G.2 and Fig. 7 .) This is essential to ensure that if t extends to a continuous linear function over CX , then such an extension is necessarily unique. We will show in Thm. G.4 that such an extension always exists.
Lemma G.2 (Concave density). The vector space generated by UX is dense in CX wrt.
· − · ∞ .
Proof. This result essentially follows from [40, Pro. 2.2] . We give the proof here for completeness.
Let UX be the set of functions that can be written as the difference of two positive concave functions from DX to R. Then UX coincides with the real vector space generated To do that we need first to show that UX is an algebra (i.e. has a zero and unit, is closed under scalar multiplication and addition and pointwise multiplication of f 's). In addition UX must "vanish nowhere" on DX and "separate points". (See below for explanations of those properties.)
UX is an algebra: Since UX is a vector space, the constant functions 0, 1 (identically 0 and 1 resp.) and the functions cf, f + g are in UX for every c: R and f, g: UX .
Let f, g: UX be such that f = u 1 −u 2 and g = v 1 −v 2 where u 1,2 , v 1,2 are positive continuous convex functions. Notice that
1,2 and (u 1 +u 2 ) 2 are positive convex functions (because the square of a non-negative convex function is convex). That is, we have f 2 ∈ UX . Now
and thus f g∈ UX , because we have just shown that all of (f + g) 2 , f 2 , g 2 are in UX .
UX vanishes nowhere: We must show that for each δ: DX there is some f : UX such that f δ = 0. But this is immediate since 1.δ = 0 for every δ: DX and 1∈ UX . UX separates points: We must show that for every pair δ = δ there is some f ∈ UX such that f.δ = f.δ . We argue as follows.
Given δ: DX (fixed) and define f δ .δ := d K (δ , δ) for δ : DX . Observe that for δ = δ we have that 0 = f δ .δ < d K (δ , δ) = f δ .δ . Thus it suffices to show that f δ ∈ UX , and we continue as follows.
For every δ 1,2 : DX , we have
That is 1 − f δ ∈ UX and thus UX separates points. By the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem [25, Thm. 5], we have UX is dense in CX .
The extension of a transformer t: UX →UX to a continuous linear function from CX to itself is done in two stages. Firstly, t is extended linearly to a continuous linear function t : UX →CX . This step is justified in Thm. G.4. Secondly, t is extended continuously to a continuous linear functiont: CX →CX . This step uses the density proven in Lem. G.2 and is shown in Lem. G.3 below. All we need to show is that the (Cauchy) completion of UX is CX , which follows from the fact that UX is dense in CX (Lem. G.2) and that CX is a complete normed vector space when endowed with the uniform norm f ∞ := f −0 ∞ . Theorem G.4 (Extension from UX to CX ). Every transformer extends uniquely to a positive continuous linear function from CX to itself.
Proof. Let t: TX be a transformer. It suffices to prove that t has a positive continuous extension t on the sub-vector space UX . If such a t exists then a unique extensioñ t: CX →CX , which is positive 23 and continuous, can be deduced using Lem. G.3.
Let f : UX , there exists
t is well-defined: We must show that t .f is independent of how f is written as the difference of two uncertainty measures. Firstly, notice that if u 1 −u 2 ∈ UX for some
t is linear and unique: Linearity is clear and it implies uniqueness of the extension t over UX .
t is 1-Lipschitz: Let f, g: UX be such that we have f = u 1 −u 2 and g = v 1 −v 2 . Then 23 For the positiveness of the continuous extension, if f is a positive continuous function that is the uniform limit of a sequence of fn's in UX , then the sequence of positive continuous functions max(0, fn)∈ UX also converges to f wrt. the uniform metric. The reason is |f.δ − max(0, fn.δ)| ≤ |f.δ − fn.δ|, for every δ: DX and positive f . Thus t.f has to be positive. 
"Definition of f, g"
Therefore, t is also continuous. t is positive: (i.e. it maps non-negative functions to non-negative functions). This follows from monotonicity of t.
By Lem. G.3, the extension t further extends into a continuous positive linear functioñ t: CX →CX witht.u = t.u for every u: UX .
Appendix H. Proof of Cor. 9.9
[ §9. 4] This proof is made easier by operating in a slightly more general space than HX , i.e. the measurable subset of DX →D 2 X , not taking advantage of the stronger conditions that characterise HX within it. In this section only we write wp. for the function defined as at Def. 9.3 but over the larger space. = E h 1 .π (λπ · ((λ∆ · E ∆ u) • h 2 ).π ) "make π explicit" = E h 1 .π (λπ · E h 2 .π u) "∆:= h 2 .π " = wp.h 1 .(λπ · E h 2 .π u).π Remarkably, it is quite easy to show that wp.() is an injection over all of DX →D 2 X . Lemma H.2 (wp.() is an injection on DX →D 2 X ). If wp.h 1 =wp.h 2 for some (measurable) h 1,2 : DX →D 2 X , then h 1 =h 2 .
Proof. We reason h 1 = h 2 ⇒ h 1 .π = h 2 .π "for some π: DX " ⇒ h 1 .π h 2 .π "wlog; ( )-antisymmetry from §6" In §11.2 a sample analysis was done on a very small program to show how, if the postuncertainty is fixed, a pre-uncertainty can be calculated once and for all; and that then that pre-uncertainty can be used to investigate the security implications of a number of different priors, without having to re-analyse the program for each one.
Here we give the calculations for wp.(·) in §11.2. We note below however that ideally the pre-uncertainty would be calculated by source-level reasoning; but that is not what we do here. (See also our "more concrete aim" in §14 concerning source-level reasoning.) Let P be the program set out in Fig. 4 (and also Fig. 5 from §4.4). As usual for weakest preconditions, we work from post-to pre-. Let u be the UM from §11.1, reflecting the circumstances of an attacker whose principal concern is whether the two bits of xs are the same.
Beginning with the second statement, since with transformers we work from the back towards the front, we expect informally that wp.[[xs:= xs1 /2 ⊕-xs]].u is just u again -since the assignment does not affect xs[0]=xs [1] , whichever branch is taken. Calculation confirms that: for arbitrary π we have wp.[[xs:= xs1 /2 ⊕-xs]].u.π = E [( (π 00 +π 11 )/2, (π 01 +π 10 )/2, (π 10 +π 01 )/2, (π 11 +π 00 )/2 )] u "semantics of xs:= xs1 /2 ⊕-xs" = u. ( (π 00 +π 11 )/2, (π 01 +π 10 )/2, (π 10 +π 01 )/2, (π 11 +π 00 )/2 ) "expectation over point hyper" = (π 00 +π 11 )/2 + (π 11 +π 00 )/2 min (π 01 +π 10 )/2 + (π 10 +π 01 )/2 "definition u from §11.2" Vol. 15:1 ABSTRACT HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS 36:49 = (π 00 +π 11 ) min (π 01 +π 10 ) = u , "definition u again" as we expected.
Continuing towards the front of the program we now calculate again for arbitrary π, but from just above able to use the same u that we started with, that wp. (π 00 /s 0 , π 01 /2s 0 , π 10 /2s 0 , 0) s0 ⊕ (0, π 01 /2s 1 , π 10 /2s 1 , π 11 /s 1 ) u " semantics of print xs[0] 1 /2 ⊕ xs [1] define s 0 := π 00 +(π 01 +π 10 )/2 s 1 := (π 01 +π 10 )/2 + π 11 " = u.(π 00 /s 0 , π 01 /2s 0 , π 10 /2s 0 , 0) s 0 ⊕ u.(0, π 01 /2s 1 , π 10 /2s 1 , π 11 /s 1 ) "E linear, applied to two-point hyper (Def. 2.5)" = π 00 min(π 01 +π 10 )/2 + (π 01 +π 10 )/2 min π 11 , "definition u from previous calculation" as claimed in §11.2.
We stress that calculating wp.() this way for any but the smallest programs is not practical at all. For a practical calculus, instead the formulation of uncertainties as loss functions would be used to write them as expressions at the source level, i.e. over program variables, and then using formal manipulations in a quantitative program logic (extending e.g. [21, 22] ).
The issue of source-level reasoning is discussed further in the conclusion §14.
Appendix J. Using loss functions to characterise pure channels
With uncertainty transformers, we can be more precise about the properties satisfied by pure-(abstract) channel HMM 's specifically. As with markovs the mechanism by which information is released is independent of the (probability) values associated with the prior; in fact it only depends on the underlying state value, that is X . This property can be described neatly in terms of a "multiplicative property" on transformers which, in addition, provides a characterisation of transformers which correspond to channels. We begin with a motivating example. Take X ={0, 1}. It's easy to construct an h: HX with the property that for all π: DX we have avg.(h.π) = π, which is to say that its markov is the identity, but it is still not a pure channel: we simply "cheat" by using a different channel for each prior. Take for example the π-indexed channels given by the matrix C π := π 0 π 1 0 1 .
The function defined f.π:= [[π C π ]] does not satisfy f =[[C:]] for any single fixed C, and this example provides the insight for characterising pure channels: they have a simple multiplicative property, which we express using loss functions as follows. Definition J.1 (Multiplicativity of transformers). For loss-function l: I→X →R ≥ and π: DX define a π-skewed loss function (l π).i.x:= l.i.x×π.x. We then say that transformer t: TX is multiplicative if for any π 1,2 : DX and loss function l we have t.(U l π 1 ).π 2 = t.(U l π 2 ).π 1 . 24 Lemma J.2 (Channels are multiplicative). Let C: X Y be a channel matrix. Then wp.[[C:]] is multiplicative.
Proof. This follows because the identity transformer is multiplicative, i.e. (U l π 1 ).π 2 = (U l π 2 ).π 1 , and that wp.() applied to a pure channel maps any given loss function to a sum of loss functions "scaled" by the columns.
The following fact shows that this multiplicative property in fact characterises channels.
Lemma J.3. Let f : DX →D 2 X be such that f.π has finite support for every π: DX ; assume it satisfies the pure-channel property from §B.2; and assume that wp.f is multiplicative as just above. Then there is some set of observations Y and channel C: X Y such that f = [[C:]].
Proof. Let N be the size of X and let υ be the uniform distribution on X . 25 Define ∆:= f.υ and let Y be the support of ∆, a finite set of distributions that will be used as column indices. Then define C: X Y by 
